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Risk-Robust Incentive Mechanism for Disaster Response: A Stochastic Simulation Based on Expected Utility Theory and Multi-Dimensional Risk 1 Department of Port Management and Maritime Logistics, Faculty of Engineering, Universitas Negeri Jakarta, Indonesia Abstract Humanitarian logistics in archipelagic countries such as Indonesia face complex, multi-dimensional risks, including operational disruptions, coordination failures, and reputational challenges. This study develops a risk-robust incentive mechanism for disaster response using expected utility theory with risk premium adjustments. A principal-agent model is formulated in which the disaster management agency (BNPB) designs incentive contracts for humanitarian actors, such as NGOs and logistics providers, who hold private information regarding their capacity and effort. The model incorporates multi-dimensional risks into both the principal^s social welfare function and the agents^ utility functions, including empirically derived risk aversion parameters. Monte Carlo simulation is applied to 10,000 hypothetical disaster scenarios with varying risk conditions to illustrate the mechanism^s application. The study emphasizes theoretical and methodological contributions rather than numerical outcomes. Results indicate that the proposed mechanism improves fulfillment rates and reduces response time compared to risk-neutral approaches, particularly under high uncertainty. Sensitivity analysis further shows that accounting for correlated risks and ambiguity aversion enhances robustness. These findings offer practical insights for designing incentive-aligned and risk-aware humanitarian logistics systems in disaster-prone regions. Keywords: Humanitarian logistics Disaster response Incentive mechanism Risk-robust design Expected utility theory Topic: Instrumentation and Computational Physics |
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